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Biotechnology Indicators for 
Public Policy 
Anthony Arundel ' 
The key issue is why one should be 
interested in biotechnology indicators and 
why we are interested in collecting them. 
From the OECD point of view, we are 
largely interested in them from a policy 
perspective. There are also two other reasons 
for collecting indicators. One is because 
they are very much of interest to academics 
who can use indicators to develop a long-
term or deeper understanding of how 
economies are structured and how 
economies can change. Second, indicators 
are of interest to private investors who can 
use the information to guide their 
investment decisions in one particular 
technology or another. But many of the 
indicators for investors come too late. This 
has always been a problem for us because 
the investment community really wants to 
know what is happening right now and by 
the time our indicators are published we 
are usually several years too late. 
From a public policy perspective, we 
are still really in the world of expectations 
when we talk about biotechnology, 
particularly modern biotechnology. I think 
we are all familiar with these type of 
expectations, and variations of them show 
up in many difFerent reports from all around 
the world. The problem with biotech is that 
many of these expectations have not yet 
been realized except in very small ways. 
Challenges in Measuring 
Biotechnology 
Partly because of the slow development of 
biotechnology applications, policy support 
for biotech is still very much dependent on 
high expectations. Governments are 
investing money in biotech because they 
still expect enormous benefits to come in 
the future. We can partly measure these 
expectations through input data such as 
business investment in R&D or the number 
of biotech firms. 
The number of biotech firms is the 
most widely available indicator but it can 
be very misleading. Even though the 
OECD publishes such data, we discourage 
its use. In biotech you are almost in a 
situation where the more commonly 
available the indicator, the less useful it is. 
This is one of them. 
A simple example can illustrate why 
the number of biotech firms is a poor 
indicator. Think of a country which has a 
hundred biotech firms with five employees 
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each, for a total of 500 employees, and 
another country which has two firms with 
2000 employees active in biotech, with a 
total of 4000 employees. In many cases 
biotechnology is likely to be more developed 
and applied in the latter country with two 
firms. Consequently, counts of the number 
of biotech firms does not really tell us much 
about the economic viability of biotech. 
One of the main functions of metrics 
IS to justify long-term targeted policy 
support for biotechnology. The most useful 
indicators for this are on the actual 
economic, environmental and social costs 
and benefits of biotech. These show high 
positive expectations for biotech, such as 
the large private and public sector 
investments in biotechnology, although 
they are largely in health applications. 
There are three main policy options 
when faced with biotechnology or any other 
technology. The first is a positive 
intervention to support biotechnology. This 
is the most common policy option today, 
with large public financial investments to 
encourage the development, adoption, and 
diffusion of biotechnology. Many of these 
programmes are targeted, meaning that 
biotechnology is actually selected and 
favoured over other options, with specific 
programmes that only fund biotechnology. 
Examples include funding for collaboration, 
public sector spin-offs of biotech, and policy 
interventions to improve public acceptance 
of biotechnology and market conditions for 
biotechnology. These policies are always 
based on the assumption that there are large 
economic or social benefits from biotech. 
The second option is to adopt a 
technology neutral stance, where funding 
is based 011 competitive bidding. An 
example is when there are many other 
competitive alternative technologies to solve 
a problem. In this case, one can leave 
investment decisions either to the market 
or to the quality of the research funding 
proposal. As an example, is there a public 
interest in targeting biotechnology research 
into nutriceuticals and functional foods? If 
not, then research in this area should not 
be targeted. Another example concerns 
animal feed. Should policy target funding 
to develop genetically modified crops that 
include phytase enzymes to reduce water 
pollution from certain types of animal 
production? The alternative is to add 
phytase enzyme supplements to the animal 
feed. In these cases with clear technological 
alternatives, it might be better to simply 
let the market decide. 
Of course, the third policy option is 
negative, in the sense of constraining or 
putting limits on investments, although the 
results might be positive. Many things such 
as regulations can actually be positive in 
the sense that they push or help guide 
public investments and private investments 
into areas that are socially beneficial. But 
there are certainly areas where regulation is 
required for technologies with potentially 
harmful effects. Gene therapy is a current 
example. 
Biotechnology in OEeD countries 
Figure 1 gives biotechnology R&D by 
businesses as a share of total business sector 
expenditures on R&D. On average, 
approximately 6 per cent ofOECD private 
R&D spending is in biotech, with 
enormous variations from almost half of all 
business expenditures on R&D in Iceland 
to two per cent in Norway and 2.4 per cent 
in Finland. Of course, a lot of the 
differences in the intensity of business 
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Figure 1: Biotechnology R&D by businesses as a share of total business 
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investment in biotechnology are based on 
difTerences in the underlying industrial 
structure. You can see that Denmark is way 
up there with about 24 per cent ofbusiness 
sector R&D going into biotechnology and 
this is because the structure of the Danish 
economy is based on pharmaceuticals and 
agriculture. 
Figure 2 gives the distribution of 
business R&D in biotechnology by 
30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 
application. Almost all R&D in the 
business sector in OECD countries is for 
health. Aside from all of the fuss over 
Monsanto and herbicide tolerant crops, very 
little goes into agricultural biotechnology 
and even less is invested in industrial and 
environmental applications. 
Results from 12 countries: Australia, 
Canada, China, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Israel, Norway, Switzerland, UK, and US. 
Figure 2: Percent distribution of total business R&D in 
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Results from 12 countries: Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iceland, Israel, Norway, 
Switzerland, UK, and US. 
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Figure 3: Public R&D expenditures on biotechnology as a percentage of total 
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Figure 3 gives public R&D 
expenditures in biotech as a percentage of 
total public expenditures on R&D, which 
gives us an idea of how much targeting 
might be going on. In New Zealand almost 
one quarter of all public investment on 
R&D is flowing into biotech. Again this is 
due to the structure of the New Zealand 
economy, which is essentially based on 
resources. There is a lot of potential there 
for biotech applications in forestry, animal 
husbandry and in crops. In Korea the high 
public expenditure share for biotechnology 
is partly due to a strategic decision by the 
Korean Government to invest in biotech. 
Figure 4 gives the percentage of all 
biotech R&D that is due to the public 
sector, which accounts for over 70 per cent 
of all R&D in Norway and Spain. This 
share is suggestive of policy targeting, 
particularly when public investment is 
greater than private investment. In Norway 
and Spain there is actually very little interest 
in biotech on the part of the business sector. 
Denmark is not a case of targeting because 
the Danish public share is less than the 
15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 
private share. But from Canada up you 
could say there are signs of policy targeting 
to favour biotech. 
Output indicators measure the actual 
use or economic impact of biotechnology 
and are consequently very useful for 
assessing the results of investment in 
biotechnology R&D. There has been a 
tremendous amount of focus in the last 
twenty years on publications and patents 
as output indicators. However, publications 
and patents are not output indicators, even 
though they are widely discussed as such. 
They are actually intermediate outputs at 
best. They measure research, but you could 
easily imagine that you can have thousands 
of patents and thousands of publications 
but nothing on the market. From the policy 
perspective, it is not the publications you 
are interested in, but the actual use of 
biotechnology. We would be happier having 
one patent and a firm with a billion dollars 
of sales based on that patent than 500 
patents and not a single product on the 
market. I think you can even go so far as to 
say that patents and publications can 
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Figure 4: Public biotech R&D as a share of all biotech R&D (public and 











become a fetish. They can disorient and 
distract us from what really matters. 
To give an example of what we have 
currently available as an output indicator, 
Figure 5 gives total bioactive employment 
as a percentage of total employment. By 
bioactive, we mean employees whose job 
description involves biotechnology in some 
way. You can see that in total over all of 
these countries, about 0.1 per cent of all 
40 60 80 
employees are active in biotech. This is a 
very small percentage of total employment. 
I put this in perspective below. 
We can supplement the sparse 
availability of post- commercialization 
output indicators that we have to date, 
which is employment and sales, with 
forecasting and developing leading 
indicators to improve predictions. This is 
possible using things such as field trial data 
Figure 5: Total bio-active employment as a percentage of 
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of GM crops, which are similar to patents 
except that they are much closer to the 
market, Another option is to analyze trends 
in clinical trials, Recent 0 ECD work under 
the Bioecorlomy to 2030 project has been 
using both of these types of data to predict 
the types of biotechnology products that 
should reach the market by 2015, 
Comparison with ICT 
An interesting comparison of relev~U1ce to 
the assessment of the economic and social 
impacts of biotechnology is to compare the 
growth of biotechnology with ICT, 
Manufacturing rCT employment reached 
a peak in 2002 when it accounted for three 
per cent of total employment in OECD 
countries, Of course, this rate of three 
percent employment has had an enormous 
social and economic impact, such that most 
people are surprised when they hear that 
I CT accounted for only 3% of employment. 
In comparison, biotech only accounted for 
0.1 per cent of total employment in 2001. 
This can appear to be negligible. Yet, if 
biotech reaches even one per cent of total 
employment, its effect will be enormous, 
although not as large as the effect of ICT. 
When we look at leT, we also see 
that in 2002 ICT accounted for 40 per cent 
of total business R&D in the OECD, 
whereas biotech accounted for six per cent. 
So, we GUl still see that as far as business 
investment goes, I CT has attracted far more 
investment than biotech. This is partly 
because we are still in the early days of 
biotech. We have now had 33 years of 
biotech since the crucial Cohen and Boyer 
patent in 1974. If you think about 33 years 
after the start of the ICT age, which is 
commonly taken as the ENIAC computer 
in 1946, we reach 1979. I CT was widely 
diffused in 1979 as mainframes, but the 
real explosion did not come until later. This 
shows how long the lead times can be for 
major new technologies like leT or biotech. 
In OEeD countries, positive policies 
that target biotechnology are actually 
difficult to justify based on our current 
economic outputs, say 0.1 per cent of 
Table 1. Therapeutic value of biopharmaceuticals and all other drugs Oan 
1986 - April 2007) 
Biopharmaceuticals All other pharmaceuticals 
N % N % 
Major advance 0 0.0% 7 0.4% 
Important advance 8 6.6% 56 3.1 % 
Some advance 21 17.4% 185 10.3% 
Minimal advance 39 32.2% 425 23.8% 
No advance (me too) 28 23.1 % 898 50.2% 
Not acceptable 12 9.9% 107 6.0% 
Judgment reserved 13 10.7% III 6.2% 
Total 121 100% 1,789 100% 
Source: Based on data from Prescrire issues between January 1986 and April 2007. All other 
drugs: 1986 -2000 data on page 59, Prescrire Jan 2001,2000 - 2006 data on page 142, Prescrire, 
Feb 2007; data for2007 from individual Prescrire issues. The evaluations for biopharmaceuticals 
were subtracted from thetotals for all drugs. 
employment. However, the main impacts 
of biotechnology are not likely to be 
economic in strict terms, but environmental 
and social. Of course, as there are many 
economists who are capable of turning 
everything into dollars and cents, we could 
get economic indicators for these effects. 
But I think for general policy and public 
purposes we would actually be perfectly 
happy to have indicators of environmental 
and social impacts without any attempt to 
try and transfer these into economic terms. 
Table 1 gives an example of a very 
powerful indicator of some of the benefits 
of biotechnology. This is the additional 
therapeutic value of pharmaceuticals that 
entered the market between 1986 and April 
2007. Additional therapeutic value is the 
extra benefit compared to drugs that were 
already on the market to treat a certain 
condition - such as psoriasis or cancer. In 
total about 24 per cent of the 
biopharmaceuticals made 'some' or higher 
advance over existing therapies compared 
to only about 14.4 per cent of all other 
pharmaceuticals coming on to the market. 
Only 23% ofbiopharmaceuticals made no 
advance (me too drugs) compared to 50% 
of all other drugs. 
Concluding Remarks 
Biotechnology has global applications, but 
these will differ substantially across 
countries. As mentioned above, in some of 
the OECD countries investment in 
biotechnology is strongly related to the 
underlying industrial structure. Countries 
that heavily invest in agriculture or 
pharmaceuticals have a much bigger 
investment in biotech. 
As a first step, we need consistent and 
internationally comparable metrics across 
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countries for biotechnology inputs, which 
are often the easiest thing to measure. We 
are increasingly trying to encourage 
countries to take the second step, which is 
to measure outputs, such as employment 
and sales. We very much need data for Asia. 
We suspect that Asia is probably the biggest 
growth area for biotech in the future, with 
more potential applications than Europe or 
the United States. This is because of the 
number of potential agricultural and health 
applications of relevance to Asian countries 
and the size of the future Asian market. 
The next point is that we need 
biotechnology metrics by application. 
Comparisons about biotechnology in 
general can muddy the picture because 
many of the benefits are application-
specific. The benefits from agricultural 
biotech are very different trom the benefits 
of health biotechnology. 
Another requirement is for better 
information on social and environmental 
impacts in a global context. These include 
both metrics and indicators, leading 
indicators, and metrics that can help predict 
the future, such as analyzing clinical trials 
and developing long-term forecasts. Long-
term here can mean anywhere from eight 
years to twenty years. Again, these forecasts 
are needed by application. 
At the OECD, we are trying to meet 
the needs of policy analysts by first 
improving national coverage within the 
member countries for basic indicators on 
biotechnology inputs. We very much would 
like to have more such data from non-
OECD countries. 
Second, we want to develop current 
and leading impact indicators by 
application. Much of the OECD work on 
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indicators occurs at the national level - we 
have national R&D expenditmes etc. - but 
many of these impact indicators are not 
needed at the national level. For example, we 
can estimate them using international data 
for clinical trials or for therapeutic value. 
Finally, the OEeD Bioeconomy to 
2030 project is using scenarios to look 
farther into the future. The project contains 
two parts. The first part uses a range of data 
to estimate trends in applications up to 
2015, while the second part develops 
'plausible' scenarios for up to 2030 in each 
of the three main applications areas for 
biotechnology. Both sets of results can help 
assist long term policy development. 
